05 KIM (CLEAN).DOCX

4/14/2015 2:37 AM

Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of
Leveraged Loans
Sung Eun (Summer) Kim†
“Leveraged” loans have reached new peaks in the post-crisis period. This
Article assesses U.S. leveraged loan regulation and highlights the ways in which
the entity- or institution-based focus of regulation have been the source of
critical blindspots that have limited the ability of regulators to monitor and
address the risks of leveraged lending. First, the current regulatory strategy,
which relies on institutions to set their own definitions of and standards for
leveraged lending activities, magnifies regulatory conflicts that are inherent in
a fragmented regulatory structure like the United States. Second, the institutionbased regulatory boundaries in leveraged loan regulation create regulatory
gaps and exclude a significant number of leveraged loans, particularly in the
market’s riskiest segments, from regulatory oversight. Third, the regulatory
focus on protecting individual institutions from the risks of leveraged lending
may inadequately protect or even undermine the safety and soundness of the
financial system. To manage these blindspots, the Article suggests a shift from
an institution-based toward a loan-based perspective in the regulation of
leveraged loans, and describes how this regulatory shift could be achieved by
relying on the regulatory infrastructure enabled by the passage of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
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Introduction
Leveraged loans, which are loans made to companies with high levels of
debt on their balance sheets, have achieved record highs in the post-crisis period,
approaching nearly two trillion dollars in loans made globally.1 Leveraged loans
in the United States have also reached record levels as lenders search for yield
and corporate borrowers seek additional credit in the low-interest credit
environment.2 Recent developments in the financial contracting, information
provision, syndication,3 and secondary trading4 of leveraged loans (both outright

1.
See Global Loans Review: Full Year 2013, DEALOGIC (2014),
http://www.dealogic.com/media/89101/dealogic_global_loans_review_-_full_year_2013_-_final.pdf
(reporting global leveraged loan volume of $1.77 trillion in 2013).
2.
Tim Cross, Leveraged Loan Volume Hits Record $537B for 2013, Topping PreLehman Levels, FORBES, Nov. 8, 2013, 1:19 PM, http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2013/11/08
/leveraged-loan-volume-hits-record-537b-for-2013-topping-pre-lehman-levels (“Loan issuance so far this
year totals $537 billion, eclipsing the $535 billion issued in 2007 [the previous record].”).
3.
Loan syndication, which is the practice of a group of two or more lenders (the
syndicate) arranging a loan, is the dominant way for corporate borrowers to obtain loans. For a helpful
primer on leveraged lending generally, including a description of the syndication process, see STEVEN C.
MILLER, STANDARD & POOR’S, LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA: A GUIDE TO THE U.S. LOAN
MARKET 5-7 (2013) [hereinafter “S&P GUIDE”].
4.
Secondary trading is the subsequent sales of loans that occur after the loans have been
made. The first growth spurt in the secondary market for loans occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
See GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, MILKEN INST., THE U.S. LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A
PRIMER 23 (2004) (“From a trading volume of just $8 billion in 1991, the secondary market for syndicated
loans increased by over 1,700 percent to $145 billion by 2003 . . . .”). The Loan Syndications and Trading
Association (LSTA) reported $170 billion of trading volume in the secondary markets in the third quarter
of 2014. See LSTA Quarterly Trade Data Study Results: Liquidity in the Secondary Loan Market
Remained Robust in 3Q14, LSTA (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.lsta.org/uploads/ArticleModel/132/attach
/3q14-lsta-quarterly-trade-data-study-results.pdf.
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and synthetically)5 have also contributed to this trend.6 Some indicators that are
commonly used to determine whether a loan is leveraged include credit ratings
(e.g., a rating of BB or lower on the Standard & Poor’s rating scale), the interest
rate that the borrower is willing to pay (leveraged borrowers will often pay 125
or more basis points above the reference rate), and whether the loan is secured
by a first or second lien.7
The financial crisis demonstrated that excessive amounts of leverage in our
financial system can have large and destabilizing effects on the economy. It also
exposed the deficiencies of our financial regulatory structure, which allowed
highly leveraged institutions and financial products to penetrate the system in
ways that undermined its safety and soundness. New agencies and guidelines
for financial regulation emerged from the recent crisis, affecting highly leveraged
entities and transactions. In March 2013, in response to the increasing volume of
leveraged loans, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve System
(the Fed) jointly issued an updated8 supervisory guidance on leveraged lending
(the “2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance”).9

5.
Examples of a synthetic purchase that replicates the direct exposure to a loan include
the purchase of a total rate of return swap (TRS), a loan credit default swap (LCDS), and investment in an
index of leveraged loan financings. Under a TRS program, the participant purchases the income stream of
the referenced loan, and LCDSs have leveraged loans as the reference instrument. Much like a holder of
the referenced loan, the participant in such programs makes money by receiving the spread of the loan
and loses money if the loan defaults or is marked down. For a description of the mechanics of such
programs, see S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 17-19.
6.
This sudden growth in leveraged lending transcends borders, with similar heightened
leveraged loan activity being reported across Europe and the Asia-Pacific. For recent reports on elevated
leveraged lending activity in Europe, Australia, and India, see Sarbapriya Ray, Exploring Leveraged
Buyout in India: An Overview, 1 INT’L RES. J. MARKETING 11 (2013); Ruth McGavin, Europe: Leveraged
Loan Manager Ranks Grow for First Time Since 2007, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2014, 10:35 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2014/01/21/europe-leveraged-loan-manager-ranks-grow-for
-first-time-since-2007; Foster Wong & Paulina Duran, Australian Loan Volumes to Exceed $100 Billion
in 2014: Mizuho, BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02
-13/australian-loan-volumes-to-exceed-100-billion-in-2014-mizuho.html.
7.
S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 23-24 (defining leveraged loans).
8.
This guidance replaces the leveraged lending guidance issued by the OCC, FDIC, and
the Fed in April 2001. Unprecedented growth and risks in the market triggered the need to update the
leveraged lending guidance. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Leveraged Lending, OCC
BULLETIN 2013-9, http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-9.html (Mar. 22,
2013) (“Since the 2001 guidance was issued, the agencies have observed tremendous growth in the volume
of leveraged credit, driven in part by demand from nonregulated investors.”); Derrick Cephas & Dimia
Fogam, Bank Regulators Tackle Leveraged Lending, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, FIN.
REGULATORY REFORM CTR., 6 (last visited Dec. 6, 2014), http://financial-reform.weil.com/federal
-reserve-board/bank-regulators-tackle-leveraged-lending/#axzz3ItwUe0f6 (“[B]ank regulators have
expressed concern that prudent underwriting practices have deteriorated and that aggregate system-wide
exposure to leveraged loans has increased at an uncomfortably high rate.”).
9.
See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & THE FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE
ON LEVERAGED LENDING ACTIVITIES (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/FR-LL
-Preamble-and-Guidance.pdf [hereinafter “2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE”].
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This Article provides a critical assessment of the regulation of leveraged
loans, including the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance, and it
points to the entity- or institution-based focus of regulations as the source of
blindspots that have limited the ability of regulators to monitor and address the
risks of leveraged lending. First, the multiplicity of agencies regulating leveraged
loans, together with a regulatory strategy that delegates definition- and
standards-setting to the supervised institutions, has created an inconsistent
“patchwork” approach to regulation (regulatory conflicts). Second, tightly drawn
regulatory boundaries exclude key players and products from the scope of
leveraged loan regulation, allowing the riskiest segments of leveraged lending
activities to operate in regulatory shadows (regulatory gaps). Third, due to the
procyclical nature of leverage, leveraged lending is an area where
“microprudential” policies, which focus on ensuring the safety and soundness of
individual financial institutions, may inadequately serve or even conflict with the
overarching mission of ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system
(regulatory myopia).
These blindspots are not unique to leveraged loans, and identifying and
correcting them is difficult because the sources of these structural deficiencies
could also be perceived as strengths of the U.S. financial regulatory system. For
instance, the multiplicity of financial regulators in the United States is the source
of overlaps, conflicts, and gaps in jurisdiction and regulatory authority.10 Yet
such multiplicity could also be seen as a potential source of healthy regulatory
diversity that facilitates a regulatory “race to the top.”11 Moreover, although the
allocation of regulatory authority between agencies based on tightly set
definitions of financial sectors and institutions may cause a jurisdictional vacuum
or shadow,12 such an approach can be effective in identifying the regulated core

10.
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT xviii (2011) [hereinafter “FCIC REPORT”].
11.
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION (2002) (arguing that concentration of regulatory authority within a single
regulator can be counterproductive and that a multiplicity of regulators could lead to more adaptive
regulations in securities regulation); Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789 (2007)
(describing the ways in which the multiplicity of regulators creates regulatory competition that reduces
incentives for regulators to manage public perceptions of how well they are regulating risk); Lawrence A.
Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary
Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 50 (2009) (describing some
advantages of a multiplexed regulatory structure).
12.
See, e.g., Where Were the Watchdogs? The Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of
Financial Governance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th
Cong. 14, 1 (2009) (testimony of Howell E. Jackson, Prof. of Law, Harvard Law School) (“Jurisdictional
divisions and subdivisions based on traditional financial sectors and subsectors create regulatory gaps and
piecemeal, inconsistent solutions to common problems.”); Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory
System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 128
(prepared statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General of the United States) (2009) (“The
current U.S. financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex arrangement of federal
and state regulators – put into place over the past 150 years – that has not kept pace with major
developments in financial markets and products in recent decades.”); Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M.
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and then drawing boundary lines to limit cross-pollination between the regulated
and unregulated spheres.13 This is also a proven way by which regulatory bounds
can be successfully enforced.14 While this Article discusses the ways in which
risk mitigation efforts in one part of the system could have a greater adverse
effect on the system as a whole, managing risks of individual institutions is one
step toward promoting the safety and soundness of the financial system.
I have two aims for this Article. First, I argue that the leveraged loan
markets have developed in ways that magnify the inherent weaknesses (which I
call “blindspots”) of the traditional institution-based and microprudentiallyfocused approach to financial regulation. Second, I propose an alternative
regulatory approach to manage these blindspots in leveraged loan regulation. My
proposal relies on the new regulatory infrastructure and tools offered by Title I
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the DoddFrank Act).
While departures from segment- or institution-based regulation have
previously been explored in other contexts,15 including as a framework to
Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 454
(1984) (arguing that regulation by reference to institutions is less effective because clear distinctions can
no longer be drawn along institutional lines); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90
B.U.L. REV. 1, 20, 43 (2010) (arguing the recent trends in the financial market and the associated risks do
not fit into the traditional regulatory categories and suggesting a supra-functional approach to regulation).
13.
One example of such regulatory efforts of line-drawing between regulated banks and
unregulated entities is Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Volcker Rule”) which, among other
things, prohibits banks from engaging in speculative trading activities unrelated to customer needs and
banking relationships. Rather than broadly restricting speculative and risky financial activities, the
Volcker Rule first draws a line around banking entities (defined as any insured depository institution and
any affiliate or subsidiary of such entity) and then restricts these organizations’ ability to engage as
principal for its own trading account to purchase or sell any security for future delivery or any option
thereon. This a regulatory strategy emphasizes the role of such banking entities as financial service
providers and prioritizes the protection of customers of these entities by limiting the ability of these
institutions to engage in activities which may create opportunities for the banking entity to breach the
fiduciary duties owed to its customers. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
14.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013) (discussing ringfencing which refers to regulating risks by restricting the type of activities that can be performed within a
firm).
15.
For a sampling of alternative approaches that have been suggested in the academic
literature to address the limitations of form- or institutions-based financial regulation see, for example,
MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 25 (2009)
(“The fault line of regulation should be primarily determined by the institution’s actions and asset-liability
structure, while its legal identity as bank, insurance company, SIV etc. should only play a secondary role”);
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000)
(suggesting regulation based on the level of information available to a particular investor); Lynne Dallas,
Short-termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 338-48 (2012)
(discussing structural regulatory responses to the recent financial crisis); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street
as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 474-82 (2011)
(suggesting regulatory separation between financial firms (i) trading and dealing in complex financial
instruments and (ii) providing purely traditional financial intermediation services); Morgan Ricks, A
Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2012) (proposing functionbased regulation for short-term borrowings or IOUs which would treat short-term borrowings and
traditional deposit instruments as a single functional category); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating
Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 474-87 (1998) (discussing risk-based regulation). In his
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reconcile the perceived limitations of existing theories,16 this Article is the first
to suggest its application to leveraged loans under the post-crisis regime. The
remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a primer and
describes recent developments in the leveraged lending market. Part II
undertakes a review of leveraged loan regulation (from the Shared National
Credit program, put in place in 1977 to regulate large credits shared by multiple
financial institutions, to the most recent 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending
Guidance jointly issued by the OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed) and identifies the
blindspots that arise from the entity-focused regulatory approach. Part III makes
suggestions for how to manage these blindspots by relying on the rules made
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act.
I. The Leveraged Loan Market
Leveraged loans are distinguishable from other commercial loans by the
debt profile of the borrower. “Leveraged” refers to the high level of debt on the
borrower’s balance sheet prior to or as a result of the loan transaction. Because
of this, leveraged loans are associated with speculative credit ratings, which
generally mean Ba1 or lower under Moody’s, and BB or lower under Standard
& Poor’s (S&P).17 Leveraged loans typically have higher interest rates to
compensate the lender for the higher default risks associated with the debt-laden,
speculative-grade borrower.18
The total value of leveraged loans issued to corporate borrowers in the
United States in 2013 was $605 billion, which surpasses the pre-crisis high
reached in 2007 and represents an almost eight-fold increase from 2008 levels.19

remarks regarding short-term wholesale funding regulation, Daniel K. Tarullo, a Member of the Board of
Governors of the Fed, emphasized the need to supplement prudential bank regulation with a new set of
policy options which “focus on particular kinds of transactions, rather than just the nature of the firm
engaging the transactions.” Daniel K. Tarullo, Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation: Remarks
at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institution Conference 14 (2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.pdf.
16.
Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis
of Function and Structure, 3 J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 1 (2005).
17.
S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11.
18.
INVESCO, LEVERAGED LOANS: AVOIDING THE INTEREST RATE TRAP (2012)
(“Investors in leveraged loans are being compensated for taking credit risks.”).
19.
Tim Cross, Leveraged Loan Market Finishes 2013 With Record $605B Issuance,
FORBES, Dec. 20, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2013/12/20/leveraged-loan-market
-finishes-2013-with-record-605b-issuance/.
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Figure 1: U.S. Leveraged Loan Volume from 1997 through 2013

Leveraged lending volume has grown not only in absolute terms but also as
a percentage of the entire loan market, with leveraged loans accounting for about
40% of new issuances in the syndicated loan markets in the third quarter of
2013.20 Leveraged loan concentrations are at the highest they have ever been
(even exceeding pre-crisis levels) and represent a significant increase from 2008
when the share of leveraged loans as a percentage of total syndicated loans was
less than 10%.21
From the supply side, why are financial institutions willing to lend to these
leveraged debtors? Shouldn’t the creditworthiness of the debtor be the central
concern for lenders?22 As explained by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency in its first study of the leveraged loan segment in 1989, although
“[l]everaged transactions often violate some traditional risk acceptance criteria
at the bank,” banks “look for strengths in the credit that can make up for the
weaknesses.”23 Not all leveraged loans are created equal: the more senior24or
secured25 the position of a lender, the more likely that there will be enough assets

20.
See Low Rates Spur Credit Markets as Banks Lose Ground, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312a.pdf.
21.
Id.
22.
Robert C. Merton, Operation and Regulation in Financial Intermediation: A
Functional Perspective, in OPERATION AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 19-20 (Peter Englund
ed., 1993) (explaining that financial intermediaries’ principal business is the issuance of contingentpayment contracts, where “creditworthiness is the central financial issue”).
23.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LEVERAGED FINANCING AND
NATIONAL BANKS 19 (1989) [hereinafter “OCC 1989 PAPER”].
24.
Seniority is the order in which creditors will be paid out from the borrower’s assets.
25.
Security is the existence of and priority with respect to collateral.
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to cover the borrower’s liabilities owed to that particular lender (though perhaps
not enough to cover the borrower’s liabilities to all lenders). To protect against
the downside, lenders are able to bargain for not only priority in payment and
collateral security, but also credit strengtheners such as guarantees and hedging
requirements.
The migration toward riskier products in the post-crisis period can also be
explained by lenders’ confidence, anti-social tendencies, and stories.26
Confidence is the level of participants’ trust in and reliance on certain factors
that impact their decision-making. When there is a lack of confidence in the
market, participants tend to become risk-averse. When there is an abundance of
confidence (or over-confidence), participants tend to engage in questionable risktaking, and safeguards and regulatory checks are not as strictly enforced. For
example, excessively confident institutions may flock to high-risk securities
without a full review of the risks involved (and in some cases an explicit
acknowledgement of the lack of such understanding).27 In short, participants are
often motivated by subjective beliefs and unwarranted levels of trust in the
market.28 The tendency of participants to look out for their interests at the
expense of others (anti-social tendencies) can also be the source of institutions’
confidence. Finally, storylines in media and industry reports chronicling doubledigit returns from leveraged loans in the higher yielding credit sectors have also
been a major driver of heightened interest and competition in the lending
markets.29
On the demand side, leveraged corporate borrowers have also been eager to
capitalize on the opportunities created by the low interest rate environment,30 and
their improved financial condition in the post-crisis period has provided them
with stronger bargaining positions as firms negotiate new loans and restructure

26.
This description of behavioral characteristics of lenders borrows from the discussion
of the psychological and behavioral drivers of the irrational market behaviors in GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 11-59 (2009). For a description of the ways in which non-rational
behaviors of capital markets can be predicted using behavioral tendencies (“animal spirits”) grounded in
cognitive and social psychology, see Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 153-68 (2003).
27.
For an explanation of the practice referred to as “big-boy” letters, which require
public-side institutions to agree to make a trade with the acknowledgement that there may be information
that they are not privy to, see S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 9.
28.
For a discussion of how overconfidence and biased self-attribution explain certain
capital markets patterns that deviate from an efficient market with rational investors, see Kent Daniel et
al., Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998).
29.
One key source of such storylines are client publications circulated by financial
service providers. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs, Asset Management: Opportunities in Senior Secured Loans,
FIXED INCOME OUTLOOK, May 2013, at 1 [hereinafter “Goldman Sachs Guide”].
30.
Reuters reports that nearly 70% of existing loans were expected to be refinanced or
repriced in 2013 as borrowers continue to take advantage of low borrowing rates. Natalie Wright, U.S.
Leveraged Loan Market Set for Another $1trln Year, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2014/01/13/lev-loan-outlook-idUSL2N0KN1BO20140113.
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existing loans with their lenders.31 While an individual with pre-existing debt
equal to more than ten times her earnings may struggle to find a reputable
financial institution that would agree to lend her additional funds, a corporation
with the same leverage ratio may be able to borrow money from the same
financial institution with ease and even receive favorable terms. As a prominent
example, H.J. Heinz Company made headlines when it was acquired by 3G
Capital and Berkshire Hathaway and the acquisition was financed with $9.5
billion in loans provided by a syndicate of banks led by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
and Wells Fargo Bank N.A. As of the closing of the Heinz acquisition, Heinz
was reported to have a debt to earnings ratio of about 10.4.32
While high levels of debt on the borrower’s balance sheet pose increased
risks for default and loss, one reason that such a high leverage ratio does not in
itself pose a barrier to borrowing for corporate debtors is that debt, up to a certain
level, could be a motivator for operational efficiency.33 From a corporate finance
perspective, a company is able to increase its returns by borrowing so long as the
additional earnings it generates from the borrowed funds exceed the required
principal payments, interest payments, and other financing costs. From a
corporate governance perspective, the periodic debt payment requirement is seen
as one way to curb corporate managers’ tendencies to shirk their duties or
mismanage excess cash flow.34 Also, for most borrowers, debt tends to be
cheaper than equity,35 and among debt, syndicated loans involve lower
information and contracting costs, which can be disproportionately high for a
leveraged borrower.36 These conditions have given rise in the post-crisis period

31.
Default rates among leveraged loans had dropped significantly to 1.5% as of February
2014 from the peak rates of more than 10.5% in 2009. Sridhar Natarajan, U.S. Leveraged-Loan Default
Rate Declines to 1.5%, Fitch Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news
/2014-03-14/u-dot-s-dot-leveraged-loan-default-rate-declines-to-1-dot-5-percent-fitch-says.
32.
Rating Action: Moody’s Lowers Heinz Ratings Following Close of LBO, MOODY’S
INVESTOR SERV. (June 19, 2013), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-lowers-Heinz-ratings
-following-close-of-LBO--PR_275875.
33.
For a description of how debt service requirements motivate operational efficiency
by serving as an aggressive performance target that keeps operations lean, see Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 328 (1986)
(“[L]evering the firm so highly that it cannot continue to exist in its old form generates benefits. It creates
the crisis to motivate cuts in expansion programs and the sale of those divisions which are more valuable
outside the firm.”).
34.
Id. (describing the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows).
35.
What Do People Mean When They Say Debt Is a Relatively Cheaper Form of Finance
than Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/debtcheaperthanequity.asp
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
36.
Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38
(1985) (“[C]ontracting costs for bank loans debt are lower for individuals and small organizations than
contracting costs for outside debt” and “signals from short-term bank loans about an organization’s
creditworthiness can lower the information costs of other contracts”). Leveraged loan borrowers, which
are by definition speculative-grade and low-credit firms, will especially benefit from such signals of
creditworthiness.
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to a leveraged loan market with high volume, lower yields, fewer covenants, and
higher leverage.37
Several external factors have also played a large role in expanding the reach
of leveraged loans, including: 1) trading practices; 2) technology and information
sharing via trade journalism; and 3) loan ratings.38 The typical leveraged loan is
originated by a syndicate of lenders for distribution to a large pool of other
lenders and is subsequently traded in the secondary markets.39 A designated
agent assumes coordination and monitoring roles, and fund transfers are wired
and received on a quick turnaround through the Fedwire.40 Non-banks such as
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs),41 loan participation mutual funds,
private equity firms, hedge funds, and pension funds have been active on both
the borrowing42 and lending43 sides of leveraged loan transactions. In addition,
leveraged loan mutual funds such as Eaton Vance Management and Fidelity
Investments offer a vehicle for retail investors to access the leveraged loan
market.44 Lenders and investors based in different physical locations now have
the ability to conduct meetings through online platforms.45 Transaction costs
have fallen due to well developed, documented, and tested procedures for voting,
replacement of nonconsenting lenders, debt buybacks, and assignments and

37.
Leela Parker Deo, U.S. Loan Market Makes Hay While the Sun Shines, REUTERS
(July 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/28/us-loan-heyday-idUSL2N0Q314S20140728.
38.
For a study of the causal effect of the introduction of ratings on the availability of
debt, see Amir Sufi, The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan
Ratings, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1659 (2009).
39.
See YAGO & MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at 23.
40.
Fedwire Services, FED. RESERVE BANK SERVICES, http://www.frbservices.org
/fedwire/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
41.
Goldman Sachs Guide, supra note 29, at 3 (“CLO issuance more than quadrupled in
the year in 2012, to approximately $55bn, the highest issuance since the 2007 peak of $94bn.”).
42.
Leveraged loans issued to private-equity sponsored portfolio companies in
connection with leveraged buyouts (LBOs), refinancings, and dividend recapitalizations reached $168
billion in the first half of 2013. Tim Cross, Led by Dell (Finally), Leveraged Loan Volume Rockets to
$20B, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2013/09/13/led-by
-dell-finally-leveraged-loan-volume-rockets-to-20b/.
43.
For an account of private investment funds’ entry into the lending market, see Sabrina
Willmer & Saumya Vaishampayan, Carlyle Seeks $1 Billion as Private Equity Fills Void, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-18/carlyle-seeks-1-billion-as-privateequity-fills-void (reporting that “Carlyle Group LP (CG:US) is the biggest of at least half-a-dozen private
equity firms raising funds to lend to U.S. mid-sized businesses, as dwindling returns from traditional bonds
have sent investors in search of income.”); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT
7
(2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents
/FSOC%202013%20Annual%20Report.pdf [hereinafter “2013 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT”] (noting that
pension funds and hedge funds have absorbed much of the new supply of high-yield loans and bonds in
the credit markets).
44.
See 2013 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 95 chart 5.5.8 (citing Lipper data
showing the increase in mutual fund holdings of high-yield bonds). These funds are also referred to as
“prime funds,” as they draw retail investment with the opportunity to earn the prime interest rate.
45.
S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8 (“Arrangers will distribute most [Information
Memos]—along with other information related to the loan, pre- and postclosing—to investors through
digital platforms.”).
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participations, among other state-of-the-art covenant architecture.46 Pricing
information available from trade associations (chiefly the Loan Syndications and
Trading Association)47 has eased the information concerns of secondary market
participants. These conditions have introduced more individuals and institutions
to leveraged lending than ever before.
The diversity of the roles of banks and non-banks involved in leveraged
lending transactions has further complicated the leveraged loan analysis. While
a standard commercial loan is a two-way transaction comprised of the lender’s
extension of credit and the borrower’s promise to repay, the role of financial
institutions in today’s leveraged lending transactions go far beyond this simple
bilateral construct. A financial institution’s role as lender entails different risk
considerations based on whether it intends to hold the loan to maturity or
distribute all or a portion of the loan and is further complicated by the additional
or alternate role it or its affiliates may have in the transaction, such as
administrative agent, collateral agent, subsequent purchaser, account bank, or
swap provider, to name a few.
Scholars studying financial innovations have termed this phenomenon the
“financial-innovation spiral,” which describes the process by which financial
products are initially offered by established intermediaries and then migrate to
markets once they have received the information provision and standardization
benefits provided by these intermediaries.48 This spiraling effect occurred in the
derivatives markets as well. Derivatives were initially traded on an organized
exchange (where contracts tend to be standardized, fungible, limited, transparent,
and regulated) but gradually were transacted over-the-counter (where contracts
tend to be private, customized, and opaque, with high levels of innovation and
low levels of regulatory oversight).49 Similarly, the fully spiraled nature of the
leveraged loan market has created new challenges for its regulation. The failure
to reorganize regulatory boundaries in response to the tendency of financial
innovations to ‘spiral’ would be to repeat the mistakes in derivatives regulation
that, in part, caused the financial crisis.50

46.

See, e.g., RICHARD WIGHT, THE LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE

(2009).
47.
About
LSTA,
THE LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING ASS’N,
http://www.lsta.org/aboutlsta.aspx?id=98 (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
48.
E.g., Merton, supra note 22 (citing John D. Finnerty, Financial Engineering in
Corporate Finance: An Overview, 17 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, no. 4, 1988, at 14, 14-33).
49.
See, e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers, Diverging Derivatives: Law, Governance and Modern
Financial Markets, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 386, 386-400 (2013).
50.
FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 46-58.
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II. Leveraged Loan Regulation
A. Overview of Leveraged Loan Regulation
One defining feature of the U.S. financial regulatory system is the
multiplicity of regulators.51 At the federal level, there are eight financial
regulators52 as well as three regulatory umbrella groups53 that oversee the
financial system.54 An implication of this regulatory structure is that two
otherwise identical commercial loans could be overseen by two different
regulators depending on the legal form of the originating bank. By way of
illustration: the OCC, subject to the general oversight of the Treasury, regulates
the lending activities of national banks, federal thrifts, and the U.S. branches of
foreign banks; the Fed, comprised of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks,
oversees the loans of holding companies, state banks, and thrifts that are
members of the Federal Reserve System and significant non-bank financial
companies designated as such by the Financial Stability Oversight Council;55 the
FDIC, an independent agency overseen by a five-member board of directors
supervises the loans of the federally insured state banks and thrifts that are not
members of the Fed; and the NCUA, an independent agency, oversees federal
credit unions and any federally insured state credit unions.56
Among banks, the segment that dominates commercial lending has
traditionally been the large national banks supervised by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).57 As such, at the early development stages
of the leveraged loan market, the OCC, with input from the FDIC and the Fed,
51.
See, e.g., Better Broth, Still Too Many Cooks: Reforming Financial Regulation in
America, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13862497.
52.
These are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (CFPB). While the total tally of eight remains the same, the composition of agencies
has changed following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, as of July 21, 2011: (i) the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which previously had primary regulatory authority over federal thrifts, was
abolished and its regulatory functions have been transferred to the OCC, Fed, and FDIC; and (ii) the
CFPB, a new federal agency tasked with implementing and enforcing federal consumer financial laws,
was created.
53.
These include the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Federal
Financial Institution Examinations Council (FFIEC), and the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets. The total tally of regulatory umbrella groups increased from two to three as a result of the passage
of the Dodd-Frank Act, by the addition of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), tasked with
identifying risks, filling gaps, and facilitating coordination among the regulatory agencies.
54.
For an overview of the role of the eight agencies and the three umbrella groups, see
MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM?
AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2010).
55.
Dodd-Frank Act §115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2012).
56.
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 60-63 (5th
ed. 2013).
57.
See 2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
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had taken the lead on many regulatory efforts with respect to leveraged loans. In
its supervision of large banks, the OCC seeks to ensure a banking system that
satisfies five objectives: (1) sound management of risks; (2) ability to compete
effectively with other providers of financial services; (3) meeting the needs of
communities for credit and financial services; (4) compliance with law and
regulations; and (5) fair access to financial services and fair treatment of
customers.58
Of these five stated objectives, the first two objectives are directly
applicable to and also in tension in leveraged loan regulation. A key challenge
for regulators has been to resolve this tension. The elevated risk of default
associated with leveraged lending undermines the touchstone principle of
ensuring safe and sound operation of financial institutions.59 At the same time,
commercial loans are among the most important assets of national banks. Among
these commercial loans, the growing prevalence of leveraged loans suggests that
banks will need to maintain leveraged loans in their portfolios in order to thrive
in the market.60
The regulation of leveraged loans falls under the asset quality category of
the safety and soundness rules. The asset quality rating looks specifically at the
credit risks associated with the loan and investment portfolio, including offbalance sheet transactions and the systems in place to manage such risks.61 The
two key components of the OCC’s analysis of an institution’s risk consists of the
quantity of risk and the quality of risk management, which encompasses the
policies, processes, personnel, and control system in place to aid management’s
ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control the subject risks.62
In its supervision of the leveraged lending activities of banks, the OCC has
identified six key risks.63 First, credit risk is the risk that the borrower will
default.64 Second, price risk reflects the fluctuations in the value of the leveraged
loan.65 Third, liquidity risk refers to the risk that the bank will not be able to meet

58.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EP-LBS, LARGE BANK
SUPERVISION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (May 2013), http://www.occ.gov/publications
/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/lbs.pdf [hereinafter “LBS HANDBOOK”].
59.
Id.
60.
For reports of domestic banks’ complaints that foreign counterparts have a
competitive advantage in their leveraged lending activities, see Tessa Walsh & Natalie Harrison, RLPCIFR-Lenders Cowed by Fed Rebuke on US Leveraged Loans, REUTERS, (Sept. 30, 2014), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/30/loans-fed-idUSL6N0RV4Y220140930 (“Fed-regulated banks,
including Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS, were said to have gained market share at the expense
of their US peers as a result of the Fed's more lenient stance.”).
61.
LBS HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 59-60.
62.
Id. at 7.
63.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, A-LL, LEVERAGED LENDING:
COMPTROLLER’S
HANDBOOK
(2008),
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type
/comptrollers-handbook/_pdf/pub-ch-leveraged-lending.pdf [hereinafter “OCC HANDBOOK”].
64.
Id. at 5.
65.
Id. at 8.
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its obligations as they come due.66 Fourth, compliance risk stems from violations
of laws, regulations, or other standards which may be implicated by conflicts of
interests and contractual and fiduciary responsibilities.67 Fifth, reputation risk is
the risk from negative publicity which may arise from a bank’s leveraged loan
activities.68 Lastly, strategic risk refers to the risk of making poor business
decisions relating to leveraged transactions in light of the bank’s overall strategic
goals.69
The OCC views risks as effectively managed when they are identified,
understood, measured, monitored,70 and controlled in accordance with a riskreward strategy or risk appetite. In this review, the individual institution
determines the threshold definition of what constitutes leveraged lending and the
actual level of leveraged loan exposure that it considers to be within or in excess
of the its risk appetite. The OCC relies on the individual institution’s internal
measures of risk to assign annual regulatory ratings. If the examiner finds that
the institution is not effectively managing risk, the OCC communicates it to
management and the board. The institution then must remedy this by reducing
exposure, increasing capital, or strengthening risk management.
Financial regulators have from time to time separately or jointly issued
specific guidelines in response to changing leveraged lending market conditions.
They include: (1) the 1988 OCC examining circular regarding highly leveraged
transactions;71 (2) the 1989 OCC study of leveraged financing activities;72 (3) the
1991 OCC banking issuance regarding troubled loans;73 (4) the 1999 OCC
advisory letter regarding leveraged lending;74 (5) the 1999 Fed supervisory letter
regarding leveraged lending practices;75 (6) the 2001 interagency guidance
regarding leveraged loans;76 (7) the 2008 Comptroller’s Handbook on Leveraged
Lending;77 (8) the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance;78 and (9) the
interagency Shared National Credit (SNC) Program.79
66.
Id. at 9.
67.
Id. at 10.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 11.
70.
LBS HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 4.
71.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EC-245, HIGHLY LEVERAGED
TRANSACTIONS (1988).
72.
OCC 1989 PAPER, supra note 23.
73.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BC-255, TROUBLED LOAN
WORKOUTS AND LOANS TO BORROWERS IN TROUBLED INDUSTRIES (1991).
74.
David D. Gibbons, OCC Leveraged Lending Advisory Letter AL 99-4 (May 3, 1999).
75.
Richard Spillenkothen, Fed Supervisory Letter SR 99-23 (Sept. 28, 1999).
76.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING ACTIVITIES (2001).
77.
OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 63.
78.
2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
79.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SNC PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
AND GUIDELINES (1998). Although not explicitly targeting leveraged loans, the supervisory focus of the
SNC Program on interbank connectivity and size of credit creates significant overlaps with the syndicated
leveraged loan segment.
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Figure 2: U.S. Leveraged Loan Regulatory Timeline
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In response to an increasing volume of leveraged loans and deteriorating
underwriting practices, the Fed, FDIC, and OCC issued the 2013 Interagency
Leveraged Lending Guidance on March 21, 2013.80 The Guidance requires
financial institutions supervised by the three agencies that engage in leveraged
lending transactions to, among other things, maintain sound risk-management
practices, underwriting and valuation standards, management underwriting
information systems, and stress tests which reflect realistic repayment
assumptions.81 Although the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance
notes the definitions of leveraged lending commonly used within the industry82
and the agencies’ own definition of the term,83 it leaves the specifics of what
constitutes a leveraged loan to be determined and updated by each financial
institution.
B. The Blindspots of Leveraged Loan Regulation
In this Section, I identify three regulatory blindspots created by misfits
between the leveraged loan markets and its regulations, and show that entitybased regulation is the source of these blindspots. First, regulatory conflicts arise
from the unequal treatment of functionally equivalent activities. These conflicts
stem from the multiplicity of regulators in the U.S. financial regulatory system
as well as the current regulatory strategy, which relies on institutions to set their
own definitions and standards of leveraged lending activities. Second, regulatory
gaps and shadows created by outmoded regulatory boundaries exclude
significant amounts of leveraged loans, particularly at their riskiest segments,
from regulatory oversight. Third, the myopic scope of the regulatory focus on
protecting individual institutions from the risks of leveraged lending
(microprudential concerns) at times conflict with or inadequately serve the
overarching mission of ensuring the safety and soundness of our financial system
(macroprudential concerns).

80.
Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al., Agencies
Issue Updated Leveraged Lending Guidance (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/press/bcreg/20130321a.htm; 2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 18.
81.
Id.
82.
A variety of metrics ranging from the use of proceeds, as well as financial ratios such
as debt-to-EBITDA ratio, debt-to-net worth ratio, and debt-to-cash flow are used to determine how much
an entity is burdened by debt. Id. at22.
83.
For example, the OCC defines leveraged lending as “a transaction where the
borrower’s post-financing leverage, when measured by debt-to-assets, debt-to-equity, cash flow-to-total
debt, or other such standards unique to particular industries, significantly exceeds industry norms for
leverage.” OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 3.
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1. Regulatory Conflicts
The overlapping and conflicting authority among multiple agencies
overseeing leveraged lending has resulted in conflicts in leveraged loan
regulation. This phenomenon is not unique to leveraged loans, as multiplicity in
the regulatory structure is a salient feature of U.S. financial regulation.84 But the
problems of regulatory arbitrage85 that arise from the differing treatment of
functional equivalents become more pronounced when, as is the case with
leveraged loans, the financial products being regulated is readily tradable and
transferable from institution to institution.
For example, the OCC and the Fed in 1999, in response to similar concerns,
issued two different letters concerning financial institutions’ leveraged lending
activities. The OCC letter focused on the characteristics of loans that deserve
special attention and may warrant a regulatory ratings downgrade. The Fed letter
focused on the financing practices of institutions rather than the features of the
loan or its borrower.86 In other instances, lenders have complained about
inconsistent treatment among regulators where the review teams came up with
varying values of the underlying assets depending on the identity of the lender.87
And even when agencies coordinate their supervisory efforts, for instance
through interagency efforts such as the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending
Guidance, differences can be observed. Agencies have posted differing estimates
of the time it would take its respondents to build and maintain a system to remain
in compliance with the guidance.88 The OCC estimates 1,705.6 hours for ongoing
use versus the FDIC estimation of 529.3 hours.89 Such divergences suggest there
may be different risk weightings placed on leveraged lending by the different

84.

For an overview of the multiplicity in the financial regulatory structure, see supra

notes 53-55.
85.
“Regulatory arbitrage” is the tendency of firms to opt for a lenient regulatory regime
to reduce their regulatory burdens.
86.
David D. Gibbons, OCC Leveraged Lending Advisory Letter AL 99-4 (May 3, 1999);
Richard Spillenkothen, Fed Supervisory Letter SR 99-23 (Sept. 28, 1999).
87.
I thank Julie Hill for this insight. Such complaints resulted in one bank’s appeal to
the ombudsman that resulted in the convening of a new review team consisting of a representative from
each primary federal agency. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Appeals Process,
QUARTERLY J., Mar. 2005, at 73-75. For an analysis of appeals of bank examiners’ material supervisory
decisions, see generally Julie Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of
Material Supervisory Determinations, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming).
88.
The 2013 Interagency Leveraged Loan Guidance provides the estimated number of
respondents, estimated average time per respondent, and the estimated total annual burden in connection
with building and maintaining a system to comply with the Guidance. See 2013 INTERAGENCY
LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 12.
89.
Id. at 12-13. The 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance explains that the
variation by agency is due to “differences in the composition of the financial institutions under each
agency’s supervision (for example, size distribution of institutions) and volume of leveraged lending
activities” but if volume of leveraged lending activities was the only explanation for the interagency
divergence, a clearer approach would be to express the burden as a function of the dollar volume of
leveraged loan transactions across all institutions.
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agencies or that there are varying capacities to regulate leveraged loans among
different agencies, and thus that there are opportunities to reduce compliance
costs associated with leveraged lending for certain types of lenders.
An additional driver of non-uniformity in leveraged loan regulation is the
amount of discretion that is permitted to each institution in determining which
loans are considered leveraged. The suggested definitions of leveraged loans
used throughout the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance are merely
that, suggestions.90 Instead, regulators have handed over the pen to institutions
to draft the definitions of leveraged lending activities and the standards that apply
to them. Allowing institutions to tailor activities to their own risk appetite could
be desirable if all loans are originated and held by a single institution until
maturity,91 but the present leveraged lending practice, which is often jointly
arranged and widely traded, demands consistent regulation. Two institutions
could be jointly arranging a loan to a high credit risk borrower, yet only one
might be accounting for and reporting it as “leveraged.”92And a third institution
that may come to hold portions of both loans will treat each based on
considerations unique to that holding institution.93 Reporting institutions will
become wedded to (after having incurred significant expenses in developing)94
definitions that may later prove to be faulty or excessively deviant from its peers.
This absence of a uniformly applicable definition of leveraged loans also creates
challenges for any regulator evaluating an institution’s leveraged loan limits
relative to its peers and across different jurisdictions and time periods.
Regulatory diversity may well be indicative of responsive and flexible
regulation.95 Professor Howell Jackson has analyzed variations in the intensity
of financial regulation across jurisdictions and explains that some of the
90.
2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 6 (“The
proposed guidance addressed this issue [comments expressing concerns over perceived “bright line”
approach to defining leveraged loans] by providing common definitions of leveraged lending and directing
an institution to define leveraged lending in its internal polices”).
91.
See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293,
300, 370-72 (2012) (discussing the benefits of modifying disclosure obligations based on banks’ internal
credit risk modeling and analysis when evaluating portfolio risks).
92.
Edward Altman and Heather Suggitt’s 2000 study is one of the few available
empirical studies of the syndicated loan markets, and the authors cite the private nature of the loan market
and the non-uniform nature of the data due to the differing internal ratings systems used by each bank as
the “major stumbling block” in their study. Edward I. Altman & Heather J. Suggitt, Default Rates in the
Syndicated Bank Loan Market: A Mortality Analysis, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 232 (2000).
93.
Andrew Lo & Thomas Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen
the Likelihood of Losses?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1775, 1775 (2012) (describing how static constraints on
leverage using “any fixed numerical limit can lead to dramatically different loss probabilities over time
and across assets and investment styles”).
94.
The Leveraged Lending Guidance, for example, estimates that, in total, the OCC,
FED and FDIC expect that the response (across seventy-five respondents) will take more than 86,280
hours. 2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 12-13.
95.
See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Agency Theory: Still Viable?: Essay: Dynamic
Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 791 (2013) (explaining the role
of dynamic elements in financial regulation).
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variations observed might be “perfectly rational” (i.e., explainable by differences
in scale, composition, and sophistication of financial services industry players,
regulatory objectives, national endowments, levels of enforcement intensity, and
levels of lawlessness across jurisdictions) whereas others might signal inefficient
regulation (such as agency capture, path dependence, and a variety of other
defects in the political process).96
Deciding which of the two explanations—rational divergence or inefficient
regulation—drives observed differences in regulation requires a review of not
only the underlying structural differences that could support the rational
divergence explanation, but also the effectiveness of safeguards put in place to
minimize inefficient regulation. In the case of leveraged loans, divergent
regulatory treatment has become increasingly difficult to rationalize in light of
the growing convergence among forms of financial institutions providing the
leveraged lending function and their leveraged loan portfolios.97 Further, the
open-ended definitions and standards-setting by financial institutions (rather than
regulators) and a lack of a centralized regulatory body to review regulatory
divergences suggest that stronger safeguards are needed to evaluate
inconsistences in the regulation of leveraged loans.
2. Regulatory Gaps
Gaps in leveraged loan regulation result from the allocation of regulatory
authority based on outmoded boundary lines and the shadows such allocation
creates. Shadows in the financial regulatory system are pockets of certain
activities, identical in function to activities performed by regulated financial
institutions, which are exempt from regulatory oversight because they are
performed by unregulated institutions or enjoy categorical exceptions from
regulation.98
The boundary problem specific to leveraged loans on the lending side arises
from the current regime’s focus on financial institutions and their activities. A
leveraged loan is no longer supervised once it leaves the books of supervised
banks, although its inherent risks continue to travel with the buyer and some

96.
Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 286-87 (2007). Regulation intensity is
measured by inputs and costs (budget and staffing) as well as the level of securities enforcement activities
(number and dollar value of sanctions).
97.
For an account of the growing “homogenization” of the banking, securities, and
insurance industries spurred by rapid improvements in information technology, deregulation, and financial
innovations from 1975 through 2000-2001, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S.
Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 222 (2002).
98.
The term “shadow bank” was coined by Paul McCulley in remarks he made at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium in September 2007. See Paul McCulley,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Symposium (Sept. 5, 2007),
http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/GCBF%20August-%20September%202007.aspx.
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residual risks remain with the seller of the loan.99 Programs such as the Shared
National Credit program have been partially successful in tracking the trends in
non-bank involvement in large complex credit transactions, but cover only those
transactions that involve at least three or more supervised institutions.100
The boundary problem specific to leveraged loans on the borrowing side is
that regulations are focused on the financial condition and enterprise value of the
borrower, but do not extend to the broader borrower group or the nature of the
collateral.101 For example, the 2013 Interagency Leveraged Lending Guidance
removes statements from the 2012 proposed guidance,102 which had required
institutions to develop general guidelines for evaluating deal sponsors, and
instead limits the requirement to only those loans with deal sponsors that are
contractually relied on as a secondary source of repayment.103 As a result,
sponsors that do not provide a formal guaranty will not be regulated. Even with
respect to the subset of loans with deal sponsors, financial institutions are
required only to document the sponsor’s willingness and ability to support the
credit.104
In addition, certain classes of debt are given lenient treatment or enjoy
exclusions from review, which may create distortions in the way market
participants structure these transactions. For example, the 2013 Interagency
Leveraged Lending Guidance specifies that fallen angels (loans that are not
leveraged loans at the time of origination but subsequently fall into that category)
should not be treated as leveraged lending transactions.105 Rather, a loan is
designated as leveraged only at the time of origination, modification, extension,
or refinance. This change was made in response to comments that suggested the
inclusion of fallen angels would “skew reporting and tracking of the portfolio,
duplicate monitoring activities, and increase costs.”106 Such exclusions,

99.
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 964 (2009)
(explaining that even in the originate-to-distribute model, large complex financial institutions “retained
residual risks under contractual and reputational commitments”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic
Policy Institution Conference, Washington, D.C.: Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm (“While the term
‘shadow banking’ implies activity outside the purview of regulatory oversight, regulated institutions are
in fact heavily involved in these activities, both in funding their own operations and in extending credit
and liquidity support to shadow banks beyond the regulatory perimeter.”).
100.
See OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 64 (“The bank regulatory agencies define a
shared national credit as a loan of $20 million or more syndicated among three or more regulated
institutions.”).
101.
2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 10-11.
102.
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, Proposed Guidance on Leveraged Lending (2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/foiadocs/2012/20120423/foia20120423.pdf.
103.
2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LENDING GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 24-25.
104.
Id. at 9.
105.
Id. at 8.
106.
Id.
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however, turn a blind eye to leveraged loans and borrowers that are deteriorating
in financial condition. Further, a regulatory process that looks to modification,
extension, or refinancing as triggering events for possible designation as a
leveraged loan could discourage formal documentation of otherwise efficient
modifications, extensions, or refinancings of troubled loans.
Another excluded class of loans is “traditional asset-based lending loans”
(ABLs). The stated policy rationale for exclusion is that “[a]sset-based lending
is a distinct segment of the loan market that is tightly controlled or fully
monitored, secured by specific assets, and usually governed by a borrowing
formula . . . .”107 But this is contradicted by the fact that structured finance
markets have continued to deteriorate for the fifth consecutive year.108 While
regulators rely on market participants to take on the monitoring and control
function for such ABLs,109 the banks that find it profitable to engage in this timeintensive monitoring tend to be smaller-sized companies.110
A key concern of regulatory leniency toward or exclusions of certain
leveraged lending activities based on the identity of the lender or borrower is that
the portion that is excluded from regulation includes the highest risk segments.
The 2013 Shared National Credit (SNC) program report provides additional
helpful insights on the distribution of such risks. The report studies 2012 data on
lending activity and notes the increased presence of noninvestment grade and
criticized credits within the sample.111 While the distribution of credits across
entity types shows that the non-bank segment holds less than one-fifth of all
leveraged loans within the sample,112 non-banks have a disproportionately large
participation in highly stressed classified credits113—$122 billion, or 62.4% of
all classified credits, to be exact. Meanwhile, the institutions insured by FDIC
own only 13.4% of classified assets and 9.5% of nonaccrual loans.114 While

107.
Id. at 21 n.5. Recognizing the practical reality that term loans to leveraged borrowers
are often extended together with a revolver that is an ABL facility, agencies have clarified that ABLs are
excluded from the scope of 2013 Interagency Leveraged Loan Guidance unless “the loan is part of the
entire debt structure of a leveraged obligor . . . .” Id. at 9.
108.
S&P Global Structured Finance Default Study, 1978-2011, STANDARD & POOR’S
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID
=124533115857.
109.
2013 INTERAGENCY LEVERAGED LOAN GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 27-28.
110.
S&P GUIDE, supra note 3, at 9 (“Finance companies have consistently represented
less than 10% of the leveraged loan market, and tend to play in smaller deals—$25 million to $200 million.
These investors often seek asset-based loans that carry wide spreads and that often feature time-intensive
collateral monitoring.”).
111.
FED, FDIC, OCC, SHARED NATIONAL CREDITS PROGRAM 2012 REVIEW 4 (Sept.
2012), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12097a.pdf?source=govdelivery (“The 2012 SNC
Review included a review of $811 billion in credit commitments covering 29.0 percent of the $2.79 trillion
SNC portfolio. The sample was weighted toward noninvestment grade and criticized credits.”)
112.
Id. (stating that the distribution of credits across entity types was: 43.2% for U.S.
bank organizations, 36.9% for foreign bank organizations (FBOs), and 19.8% for non-banks).
113.
Id. (“Classified assets include assets rated substandard, doubtful, and loss.”).
114.
Id.
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individual banks may have been successful in transferring their problem loans to
the non-bank segment, total levels of leveraged loans system-wide have shown
a continued upward trend.115 These trends suggest that the regulatory gap has
further widened and the loans in the regulatory blindspot represent higher
volumes of higher risk loans.
3. Regulatory Myopia
The last category of blindspots created by the entity-based approach to
leveraged loan regulation is that each agency’s focus on protecting the lenders
that it oversees from the risks of leveraged lending may conflict with the
overarching mission of ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system.
For example, one group of lenders’ sudden exit from the leveraged lending
markets could cause or accelerate a rapid downturn in the broader leveraged
lending markets, yet such lenders and their regulator may fail to internalize the
impact their actions will have on the markets more generally.116 The focus of
leveraged loan regulation is on the individual- and transaction-level controls:
valuations, deal pipeline, management information systems, and risk ratings.117
However, built-in amplifiers in our financial system118—such as interbank
exposures, risk-based capital regulation, and the procyclical nature of leverage—
result in shocks to our financial system from leveraged lending activities that are
greater than the sum of the risks inherent in their parts.119
There are also important system-level and public interest considerations120
associated with leveraged loans that require a systemwide perspective in their
regulation. These include the possibility of runs on the leveraged borrower,
concentration risks, and pricing risks. The roots of such risks can be traced back
to excessive optimism that permeates the system when private actors that bear

115.
Blaise Gadanecz, The Syndicated Loan Market: Structure, Development and
Implications, BIS Q. REV. 75, 84 (2004) (“US banks, whose outstanding syndicated loan commitments
are regulatory monitored by the Federal Reserve Board, appear to have been relatively successful in
transferring some of their syndicated credits, including up to one quarter of their problem loans, to nonbank investors.”).
116.
Recent orders by regulators to select banks to step out of the leveraged loan market
were criticized for failing to consider negative externalities on borrowers. Kristen Haunss, Fed Loan
Warning May Hurt Riskiest Borrowers, Trade Group Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-24/fed-said-to-issue-warning-about-lax-leveraged-loan
-underwriting.html.
117.
See generally S&P GUIDE, supra note 3.
118.
For a detailed discussion of the factors that amplify shocks to our financial system
see BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-24.
119.
Id. at 13 (“The current philosophy of banking regulation—that you can make the
system safe by making individual institutions safe—is an unsatisfactory basis for insuring the stability of
the system as a whole.”).
120.
E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW 4-5
(1987) (describing public interest considerations associated with banking and finance including
concentration concerns, conflicts of interest, investor protection, and unfair competition).
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only a portion of the downside risks but enjoy all of the upside are the drivers of
markets.121
Both financial economists and legal scholars have emphasized the
importance of regulating the leverage levels of both lending and borrowing
entities to ensure the resilience of the financial system against amplified
shocks.122 The common thread in this literature is the connection between
funding conditions and asset prices.123 While the asset is held for its exchange
value, which is primarily a microprudential concern, the secondary funding
impact creates public externalities that require a system-level (or
macroprudential) approach to their regulation.
Professor Geanakoplos outlines the eight problems of leverage, each of
which highlights the ways in which actions that may enhance the safety and
soundness of individual institutions may also have deleterious effects on the
overall system. They are that: (1) optimistic investors impose externalities if they
internalize only private losses; (2) debt overhang destroys productivity; (3)
seizing collateral tends to destroy value; (4) failure to curtail leverage at high end
results in a drastic fall in prices; (5) swings in asset prices have profound effects
on economic activity; (6) small businesspeople that are not hedged against
downturns suffer at the bottom of the cycle; (7) swings in asset prices lead to
massive redistributions of wealth; and (8) government’s reactive response to
crisis creates inefficiencies and moral hazard.124
To synthesize this literature and its application to the present day leveraged
loan markets, leveraged credit tends to be overpriced or temporarily unavailable
for qualified leveraged borrowers when there is industry-wide pessimism, but
underpriced and widely available when there is industry-wide optimism.125
Taking the impact of pessimism on the leverage cycle as an example, bad news
(or anticipation of bad news) creates uncertainty. The exit of lenders based on
actual or perceived risks (which could be likened to a run on leveraged borrowers
if based on perceived rather than actual risks) impedes the availability of funds
or increases cost of funds from traditional regulated sources. Collateral rates
sharply increase as a response and create syndication challenges for lenders,

121.
Id. at 9.
122.
See, e.g., Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, 19 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 418, 436 (2010) (noting the two distinct balance sheet channels which amplify financial
shocks throughout system); José Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New
Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 502-04 (2009) (discussing the regulatory implications for leveraged
loans); John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle, FRBNY ECON.
POL’Y REV. 104, 117 (2010) (explaining the important role of government at each stage in containing the
bad news and intervening to stabilize margins and inject equity back into the system).
123.
Id.
124.
Geanakoplos, supra note 122, at 107-08.
125.
For empirical work which shows that bank loans in particular behaved in a much
more procyclical manner than their bond counterparts during the recent financial crisis, see Fiorella De
Fiore & Harald Uhlig, Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics
2012 Meeting Papers, Nov. 2012), https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_429.pdf.
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while otherwise qualified borrowers face reduced availability of funds or
increases in the cost of funds.126
The domino effect or contagion is sped up by cross-default and crossacceleration provisions common in leveraged loan agreements.127 The aftermath
is that vulture investors specializing in the purchase of distressed debt emerge as
winners;128 the losers are the borrowing and lending entities that have been
forced out of business.129 For this reason, a regulatory approach that ensures the
rationality of individual actors and the particular agencies overseeing them is a
necessary but insufficient condition for protecting the financial system against
the systemic implications of inevitable downturns in the leveraged lending cycle.
III. Managing Blindspots of Leveraged Loan Regulation
The financial crisis revealed the extent to which using static boundaries to
regulate rapidly evolving financial products allowed risk to build up in nooks
and crannies in the financial system.130 This Article describes the ways in which
the institution- or entity-based approach to regulating financial activities has
created conflicts, gaps, and a myopic focus in leveraged loan regulation.
In this last Part of the Article, I explore the suitability of the newly formed
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or “the Council”), and its data
collection arm, the Office of Financial Research (OFR or “the Office”), to

126.
See Geanakoplos, supra note 122, at 106.
127.
A cross default clause in a loan agreement provides that the borrower’s default
under another agreement will trigger an automatic event of default under this agreement. A cross
acceleration clause provides that the borrower’s default under another agreement will trigger an event of
default under this agreement if the counterparty under the other agreement accelerates payment.
128.
The Vultures Take Wing: Banks and Hedge Funds Get Ready to Capitalise on
Corporate Misery, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2007: (stating that the defining characteristic of the distressed
debt investor is its ability to capitalize on corporate misery), http://www.economist.com/node/8929289.
129.
CORRIGAN, supra note 120, at 9 (“[F]irms seem to believe they can feather their
own nests at the expense of someone else while that someone else has the same motivation but in the
opposite direction. Regrettably, it would seem this process can only put further pressures on prices and
spreads and thereby elevate the risk that the transition process will be disorderly—something that we must
be especially sensitive to in banking and finance.”).
130.
See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks than the Previous Ones?, 60 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1339,
1351-1352 & n.60-64 (2011) (describing the supervisory authority of the now-abolished OTS over thrift
holding companies like AIG). As another example, large financial conglomerates such as Bear Stearns
whose demise headlined the 2007-2009 crisis, were, upon the voluntary election by such entities,
supervised by the SEC as investment bank holding companies under the consolidated supervised entity
(CSE) program which was abolished in 2008. For a further discussion of the CSE program’s role in
overseeing Bear Stearns, see SEC Office of Inspector General, REPORT NO. 446-A, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF
BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: CONSOLIDATED-SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (Sept. 25,
2008), http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf.; Press Release, SEC,
Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm. The optional nature of the CSE program and the lack
of authority of the SEC were considered the key weaknesses of the program and the explanation for its
failure to identify and respond to emerging risks. Id.
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manage the blindspots identified in Part II.B. In particular, I point to specific
sections of the Dodd-Frank Act that make reference to not only entities but also
activities and products as the primary determinants of the scope and design of
financial regulation. As outlined in Section 112(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Council is tasked with identifying risks to U.S. financial stability that could arise
from particular companies or funds, and also ongoing activities in the financial
services marketplace.131
Both FSOC and OFR were created by Title I of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Financial Stability Act of 2010).132
The major reason for the creation of these two new regulatory bodies was to
remedy regulators’ inability under the pre-crisis regime to monitor and prevent
systemic risks. In creating these agencies, Congress recognized that systemic risk
could not be regulated without standardized, advanced tools for measuring
systemic risks.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council consists of ten voting members
(the Treasury Secretary, Fed Chair, Comptroller of the Currency, CFPB Director,
SEC Chair, FDIC Chair, CFTC Chair, FHFA Director, NCUA Chair, and an
independent insurance expert appointed by President) and five advisory
members (the OFR Director, Federal Insurance Office Director, a designated
state insurance commissioner, a designated state banking supervisor, and a
designated state securities commissioner).133 The purpose of the OFR is to
support the Council as it carries out its duties by collecting data, standardizing
the types and format of collected and reported data, and performing applied and
long-term research.134 The Office is headed by a director that is appointed by the
President and is tasked with developing the tools for measuring and monitoring
systemic risks.135 The Council is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and may also
appoint advisory, technical, or professional committees to carry out its
functions.136
Section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Council the authority to
make specific recommendations for new or heightened regulation for activities
which could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other

131.
Sections 119(a), 120(a), and 120(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Council
with the authority to resolve jurisdictional conflicts and apply new or heightened prudential standards and
safeguards for not only specific institutions, but also specific activities and practices. 12 U.S.C. §§
5239(a), 5330(a), and 5330(b)(1); see also Whitehead, supra note 12, at 137 (describing how the DoddFrank Act, through its creation of the FSOC, allows the regulatory response to meet the demands of a
more flexible financial system).
132.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 111-23, 151-56, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-1420 (2010). FSOC is created by Subtitle A and the OFR
is created by Subtitle B of the Financial Stability Act of 2010.
133.
Fin. Stability Oversight Council, About FSOC, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (last
updated: Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx.
134.
Dodd-Frank Act § 153(a).
135.
Id. at § 152(b).
136.
Id. at § 111.
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problems spreading among bank holding companies and non-bank financial
companies.137 Relying on this authority, and its power to direct the OFR, this
Part highlights the ways in which the FSOC could serve a key role in managing
the blindspots of leveraged loan regulation identified in Part II.
A. Managing Regulatory Conflicts
The sources of regulatory conflicts in leveraged loan regulation include the
multiplicity of leveraged loan regulators and regulators’ delegation of the
definition and standard setting processes to financial institutions.
One of the OFR’s primary functions is to standardize the types and formats
of data collected by financial regulators and to develop uniform tools for risk
measurement and monitoring.138 In carrying out these functions, the Office has
the power to issue regulations and orders in order to collect and standardize data
and assist member agencies in determining the types and formats of data that
they may collect.139 Any such rules regarding standardization that are set by the
Office will have binding effect on the member agencies.140 Any directions given
by the Council or by the OFR with respect to the types and formats of data
required must be implemented by the primary financial regulator in a manner
acceptable to the Council.141
In this way, the OFR can play a key role in both resolving jurisdictional
conflicts and disputes between agencies and setting uniform definitions for
leveraged loan regulation. Leveraged lending, after all, is one of the activities
identified by the Council as requiring special regulatory attention.142 To aid the
Council in its determination of the applicability of heightened standards for
leveraged lending activities, the OFR has the ability to ensure compliance with
the methods and standards for reporting data related to leveraged lending.
Regulators have previously been successful at regulating leveraged loans
with uniform benchmarks. In 1988, when the OCC first released its Examining
Circular (EC-245) specific to highly leveraged transactions (or HLTs),143 it used

137.
Id. at § 120.
138.
Id. at § 153(a).
139.
Id. at § 153(c).
140.
Id. at § 153(c)(2).
141.
Id. at § 120(c)(2).
142.
In the most recently issued FSOC Annual Report, seven concerns about financial
stability are identified, among which leveraged lending activities were listed under the fifth concern,
“Interest Rate Risks.” See 2013 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 3, 7, 15-16. The Report notes
the elevated levels of leveraged loan issuance across the board (by depository institutions, credit unions,
broker-dealers and bank holding companies) and their ability to create outsized risks to the entire system.
Other areas of concern noted in the Report include reducing the susceptibility to runs in wholesale funding
markets (first theme), responding to technological and operational failures (third theme), and restoring the
integrity of reference interest rates such as LIBOR which serve as benchmark rates for trillions of dollars
of transactions (fourth theme). Id. at 3.
143.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 71.
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a definition of HLTs that considered both the use of proceeds (i.e. buy-out,
acquisition, or recapitalization of an existing business)144 as well as the
underlying characteristics of the transaction.145 This multi-pronged definition of
leveraged lending can be drafted in a way that is responsive to the fast-paced
changes in leveraged loan products.146 While the substance and procedures of
leveraged lending transactions has changed significantly in the past twenty-five
years, EC-245 could provide a useful benchmark in creating and enforcing a
uniform definition of leveraged loans. Efforts to keep these definitions current
would fall under the OFR’s regulatory turf.
Section 120 of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires that the specific
recommendations made by FSOC be subject to public notice and comment.147
The procedural rigors of notice and comment should mitigate the rigidities of a
one-size-fits-all approach to regulating leveraged loans. Comprehensive
leveraged loan regulation requires the input of, among others, (1) borrowers
regarding their experiences in obtaining and rolling over credit; (2) law firms
specializing in borrower and lender representation regarding developments in
contracting and underwriting standards; (3) accounting firms regarding
deficiencies and material restatements in their audits of leveraged loan
transactions and leveraged borrowers; (4) rating agencies regarding issuer and
loan rating trends; and (5) trade associations regarding the leveraged lending
market broadly. Such consensus-building efforts are intended to update
regulatory standards to reflect trends in volume, maturity, pricing, and defaults,
and to examine the drivers underlying such trends.148 By liaising with these

144.
OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 62.
145.
Id.
146.
A recent study shows that banks loans are frequently amended (typically every 98
months, and almost five times during the life of the contract) to modify contractual constraints designed
to mitigate information related problems. See Michael R. Roberts, The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation
and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (Sept. 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Social Science Research Network), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1732364.
147.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 120, 124 Stat. 1376, 1408-10 (2010). For an examination of the notice and comment process during
pre-proposal rulemaking phase for one section of the Dodd-Frank Act (Volcker Rule), see Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
53 (2013).
148.
One example of consensus building that could serve as a useful model is the
Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s recent approach to supervising financial institutions’ risk cultures.
FSB’s stated goal is to deliver “pre-emptive, rather than reactive, outcomes-based supervision,” stating
that the success of anticipatory supervision depends on “the ability to engage in high-level sceptical
conversations with the board and senior management on the financial institution’s risk appetite
framework.” Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of Supervision; Guidance on Supervisory
Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture, FIN. STABILITY BD. 1 (2013), http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/c_131118.pdf. The FSB paper explores the elements that
help promote a sound risk culture such as tone from the top, accountability, opportunity to challenge
decision-making processes, financial and non-financial incentives, and how regulators can identify such
elements and assess the strength of risk management. Id. at 9-13. In its request for public comment, the
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stakeholders at the initial stages and on an ongoing basis, regulatory definitions
can be reflective of and responsive to market developments.
B. Managing Regulatory Gaps
Gaps in regulatory oversight created a “shadow” that contributed to the
recent financial crises.149 While the Dodd-Frank Act introduced reforms to
address shadow banking problems revealed by the recent crisis,150 leveraged
loans continue to be subject to numerous regulatory exemptions that generally
leave the riskiest leveraged loans unregulated.151 The fast-paced growth and
dispersion of leveraged loan activity demands a regulatory approach that
canvasses all leveraged loans regardless of the form of the transacting entities,
the security provided, the timing of when the loan becomes leveraged, or the
identity of the borrower’s ultimate parent.
One way the post-crisis reforms can facilitate this regulatory shift is by
incrementally broadening the scope of regulated entities. For example, a nonbank institution and its activities may be designated as a “significant non-bank
financial company” to be supervised by the Fed if FSOC finds that it is
predominantly engaged in financial activities.152 This designation provides the
FSOC with the ability to recommend that the Fed impose additional standards on
financial activities conducted by designated companies.153 In determining
whether an entity is “predominantly engaged in financial activities,” FSOC looks
at the activities of the entity that are “financial in nature”154 as a percentage of
the entity’s total revenues or assets.155 As of November 15, 2014, only four
companies—American International Group, Inc., General Electric Capital

FSB has sought suggestions for specific tools (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, analyses of internal
documents, codes of ethics, or risk appetite statements) for assessments and engagement and for specific
examples of good practices used to make risk culture tangible. See id. at 4; GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY
INTERACTION WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON RISK CULTURE (Dec. 23, 2013), http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/c_131223.pdf.
149.
See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 262 (Fall 2010). Professors Gorton and Metrick point to three
areas—money market mutual funds, asset securitizations, and repurchase agreements—where the
regulatory and legal changes coupled with a series of financial innovations facilitated the rise of a shadow
banking system that contributed to the recent financial crises.
150.
Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG.
91, 103 (2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Act addresses these problems [referring to the rise of shadow banking
system that allowed financial firms to take on additional risk without adequate safeguards] by introducing
transparency requirements and effective, consolidated supervision over the most important shadow
banking instruments—over-the-counter derivatives, repurchase (‘repo’) agreements, and securitized
assets.”).
151.
See supra Part II.B.ii.
152.
See Definitions Relating to Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act (Regulation PP), 12 C.F.R.
§ 242 (2013).
153.
Id.
154.
The Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1841 § 4(k) (2012).
155.
Dodd-Frank Act §102. 12 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012).
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Corporation, Inc., Prudential Financial, Inc., and Metlife, Inc.156—have been
designated as significant non-bank financial companies. Whether the private
equity firms, hedge funds, pension funds, collateralized loan obligations, and
loan participation mutual funds that are actively involved in leveraged lending
will be subject to this designation remains to be seen.157
The Council’s emphasis on gap-filling and holistic oversight provides a
more immediately implementable basis for gap filling in leveraged loan
regulation. Although many of the non-bank institutions engaged in leveraged
lending may not be designated as significant non-bank financial companies, they
could still be subject to heightened regulation if the Council determines that the
market activities they are engaged in pose a risk to financial stability.158 Such an
approach can help bring into regulatory ambit certain activities that could be the
source of build-up and unraveling of risks and shocks to our system, which would
otherwise have been excluded due to the unregulated status of its lender or
investor.159 Once the Council identifies the activities for which such a
comprehensive regulatory approach is appropriate, it could rely on its data
collection arm, the OFR, to develop the technical tools to regulate systemic
financial risks.
These efforts to expand regulatory boundaries must also consider the efforts
of our regulatory counterparts abroad. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) provides a forum for international cooperation on banking
supervisory matters.160 The BCBS sets forth minimum generally applicable
standards for all specified areas161 (among which leveraged lending activities fall
under “Credit Risk”) and the principles for managing credit risk and evaluating
compliance therewith is set out in the core principles.162 Specifically, these
principles require supervisory access to information and ability to determine
whether supervised institutions have: (1) incorporated an appropriate risk
156.
Metlife, Inc. is contesting its designation as a non-bank Systemically Important
Financial Institution. Metlife, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 3, 2014).
157.
Up to date information regarding the designations is available on the Treasury
website. Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations
/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
158.
Dodd-Frank Act § 120(a).
159.
COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 44-47 (2010).
160.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) brings together the senior
representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The BCBS Core Principles Group includes
representatives from member countries and regional groups of banking supervisors, as well as the IMF,
World Bank, and the Islamic Financial Services Board.
161.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 9-14 (2012), http://www.bis.org/publ
/bcbs230.pdf.
162.
Id. at 46-47.
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management process; (2) properly controlled credit risk environments; (3)
included credit risk exposures into stress tests; and (4) made arm’s length credit
decisions, among other specified criteria.163 To participate in such coordination
efforts, the work of the OFR in inventorying domestic institutions’ exposures to
the risks of leveraged lending, irrespective of such institutions’ regulated status,
is needed. The ongoing work of the OFR towards developing a Legal Entity
Identifier (LEI)164 to identify all parties to financial transactions will help to
bridge the identified gaps in leveraged lending regulations as well.
C. Managing Regulatory Myopia
As discussed before, entity-based regulation may at times undermine the
broader financial system’s safety and soundness. Dodd-Frank’s emphasis on
system-level risks and FSOC’s prospective approach, however, are intended to
complement the predominantly institution-based and responsive approach of
traditional financial regulation. Under Section 120(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act,
systemic considerations are prioritized if the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale,
concentration, or interconnectedness of that activity or practice could create or
increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems.165 Such efforts
are needed to complement the traditional entity-focused approach of leveraged
loan regulation, which may miss important amplification mechanisms in the
leveraged loan cycle.
We have seen some elements of systemic risk management in past
leveraged loan regulations. For example, the OCC banking issuance (the
“Issuance”) regarding troubled loans and loans to borrowers in troubled
industries voiced concern about financial institutions unnecessarily restricting
the availability of credit to sound borrowers.166 The Issuance supplemented the
traditional institution-level focus of regulators by recognizing the system-level
impact of lenders’ herd behavior during periods of financial distress. The
requirements set forth in the Issuance were intended to “help institutions avoid
unnecessarily restricting the availability of credit to sound borrowers,” balanced
against “effects, both positive and negative, that such loans have on the bank’s
financial condition and results of operations.”167
The systemic focus of FSOC is intended to formalize this dynamic between
micro- and macro-prudentially focused regulations. As a result, cooperation
among FSOC and primary regulators becomes an essential element of the

163.
Id.
164.
2013 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 20.
165.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 120(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1408-09 (2010).
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BC-255, TROUBLED LOAN
166.
WORKOUTS AND LOANS TO BORROWERS IN TROUBLED INDUSTRIES 1 (1991).
167.
Id. at 1-2.
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proposed regulatory framework. FSOC has the power to issue recommendations
to primary regulators to apply additional standards and safeguards for specified
financial activities. The primary financial regulator must then impose the
standards recommended by the Council or similar standards otherwise
acceptable to the Council.168 The implication for leveraged loan regulation is that
FSOC, or its designated committee, now has the authority to superimpose
regulations that mitigate systemic risk that will then supersede regulations that
focus only on institutional risk mitigation (to the extent the two realms conflict).
In addition, pooling regulatory authority over leveraged lending within a
single unit within the FSOC, such as a specially created committee, could create
a platform to train and deploy dedicated specialists that have the tools needed to
effectively oversee them. Without this platform, the costs of building up the
requisite level of expertise within each individual agency will likely lead to
outsourcing to private sources of some of the due diligence and monitoring
functions over leveraged lending. Such outsourcing is problematic bearing in
mind private monitors’ known tendency to underestimate risks.169
The key strength of FSOC’s approach to regulating leveraged loans is its
comprehensiveness—no entity can evade or arbitrage regulation by changing its
institutional structure or by using marginally different financially engineered
products. However, there are two key challenges to systemic risk management
regulation that FSOC must consider. First, it is not clear whether comprehensive
safeguards produce a net benefit.170 Second, it may prove arduous to coordinate
the regulatory efforts among the multiple leveraged loan regulators.
Bearing these challenges in mind, regulators might consider a hybrid
approach that divides regulatory authority and strategy based on the degree of
systemic risks inherent to an institution. Professor Brunnermeier et. al propose
such a framework,171 where institutions are grouped according to a measure of
risk-spillovers: “individually systemic” institutions “that are so large, so
massively interconnected, and so iconic” involve the greatest spillover risk and
require both macro- and micro-prudential regulation.172 Brunnermeier terms the
next tier “systemic as part of a herd.”173 These are institutions whose individual
conditions may not be of great concern, but whose correlated movements as a

168.
Dodd-Frank Act § 120(c).
169.
See, e.g., Geanakoplos, supra note 122, at 115 (“Some investors forgot the
incentives of the rating agencies and the incentives of many market actors to downplay seriously the
probability of highly correlated defaults.”).
170.
Section 123(a)(12) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Council to conduct an
economic impact study of the financial services regulatory limitations intended to reduce systemic risks,
which estimates the benefits and costs on capital market efficiency, the financial sector, and national
economic growth. Dodd-Frank Act § 123(a)(1).
171.
BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 25-26.
172.
Id. at 26.
173.
Id.
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“herd” may have systemic impacts. These institutions require some macroprudential regulation, but limited micro-prudential regulation. Highly levered
hedge funds and private equity funds that are active in leveraged lending
activities would fall under this category. The remaining groups—“non-systemic
large” and “tinies”—are institutions that have minimal systemic impact and
therefore require no additional macro-prudential regulation.174 Brunnermeier’s
approach could be relied upon to resolve tensions between institution- versus
system-based considerations that may arise in an activities-based approach to
regulating leveraged loans.
Conclusion
This Article has reviewed the leveraged loan market and has identified the
regulatory blindspots that distort or fail to account for pertinent risks of leveraged
lending. Leveraged loans are highly complex and risky products that create
networks of risks largely unobserved by the microprudential eye of primary bank
supervisors. The growth of leveraged loans and the diversity of leveraged loan
regulators make leveraged loans particularly susceptible to recurring regulatory
avoidance and arbitrage problems. The failure of pre-crisis regulatory programs
to pick up on early warnings signs of excessive leverage leading up to 2007-2009
also indicates the deficiencies of the presently fragmented approach to leveraged
loan regulation.
This Article offers one way to rely on Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Office of Financial
Research to manage the blindspots of leveraged loan regulation. The proposed
changes to leveraged loan regulation should be regarded as a pilot program
which, if successful, could be expanded to other areas of our financial system
that are purveyors of similar risks and vulnerable to similar regulatory blindspots.
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